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ABSTRACT
This paper presents  a mathematical programming model of wheat cleaning and
blending decisions at a country elevator.  Simulations are performed  to illustrate the
sensitivity of cleaning to selected variables, including the value of screenings,
transportation costs, and market discounts for excess dockage.  In addition, the model is
used to assess the impact of including dockage in the grade standards for wheat.TABLE  OF CONTENTS
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Dockage is not formally regulated in the US marketing system.  In the context of
current US standards,  dockage is a "non-grade-determining  factor."  Other major wheat
exporters such as Canada  and Australia  impose stringent  grade limits on dockage.
Changes have been proposed for US grade standards  with a view toward reducing levels of
dockage and enhancing the competitiveness of US wheat in world markets.
In evaluating such proposals, it is crucial to understand  how individual firms view
cleaning decisions.  This report develops an analytical  model of cleaning decisions from the
perspective of a typical country elevator in North Dakota.
The model has features of a classic blending problem.  The elevator has a number of
grain bins containing wheat with different levels of dockage and other attributes. Wheat
can be sold directly from each bin, or blended to meet a set of contract  specifications.
Cleaning'is an additional  activity in  the model.  Cleaning operations  produce screenings,
which are sold as animal  feed.  The firm realizes savings on transportation  costs when
wheat is cleaned prior  to shipment.  However, cleaning also involves a loss of salable
wheat, as shrunken and broken kernels are removed with dockage.
The objective of the firm is to maximize net revenue from wheat sales and sales of
screenings, net of cleaning and transport  costs.  The maximization is subject to a number of
constraints,  including maximum or minimum factor limits for wheat sold under contract.
Simulations are conducted with parameters  for two representative  crop years, 1987 and
1990, to demonstrate the importance of interyear  differences in  wheat cleaning incentives.
Cleaning wheat is a routine part  of elevator operations  in  some parts of the United States,
particularly  in the spring wheat growing regions. Results of the simulations conducted in
this study can be used to draw several important conclusions:
* While numerous variables affect incentives to clean wheat, two of particular
importance are the value of screenings and the cost of freight. Increases  in  these
variables induce additional  cleaning by the country elevator. Incentives to clean are
also highly dependent on market conditions which change through time.
* Though not pervasive in  current trading  practices, an alternative to imposing
regulations  to induce cleaning  is for buyers and sellers to negotiate discounts for
dockage in  excess of particular  levels.  In  1987 a discount of 1/2 cent per bushel
would have induced additional  cleaning to 0.5 percent dockage.
* Introduction  of grade factor limits for dockage with a breakpoint at 0.5% between
grades 3 and 4 would have had minimal impact on cleaning activity in  1990.
However, this would have resulted in  increased  cleaning in  1987, at an additional
cost of 0.7 cents per bushel.
Our results suggest that  proposed changes in grade standards  would have little
impact on cleaning decisions by country elevators.  Other incentives already induce
cleaning in  the spring wheat region. However, our model is developed from the perspective
of an elevator with adequate cleaning capacity in place.  The impact of a change in
standards  would fall heavily on elevators that lack such capacity.
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I. Introduction
U.S. grain quality and the interaction of official  standards with commercial  needs
are subjects of continuing interest to policy makers.  Recently, attention has focused  on
the implications of dockage and other quality characteristics  for U.S. export
competitiveness.  A comprehensive analysis by the Office  of Technology Assessment  (OTA)
provided motivation  for several features  of the  1990 Farm Bill pertaining to grain quality.
However,  issues related  to grain cleanliness  have been debated for at least a decade, and
allegations  have frequently been made that high levels  of dockage (non-millable material)
place t.S. wheat at a competitive disadvantage in world markets.  While other exporting
countries  (e.g., Canada and Australia) clean wheat intensively before export, U.S. dockage
levels are not subject to formal regulation.  The existing U.S. standards  treat dockage
(like protein) as a non-grade-determining  factor.  Contract specifications and commercial
incentives  determine dockage levels in U.S. wheat exports  and throughout the marketing
system.
There have been numerous proposals  to "regulate" dockage through changes  in
grade standards. 2  When evaluating such proposals, it is crucial to understand how
economic  factors and commercial  trade practices  influence  firm-level cleaning decisions.
The objective of this study, which  is one of four prepared under a USDA cooperative
agreement,3 is  to develop an analytical  model of cleaning decisions.
A decision model for a representative country elevator is presented.  Simulations
are performed to illustrate impacts of important variables  on the economics of cleaning
and to assess implications  of alternative constraints.  The model is normative:  it identifies
an "optimal" set of actions by the elevator given an objective  of profit maximization.  For
this reason, the model can be used to predict how individual  firms would respond to new
regulations or other changes  in the economics  of cleaning.
Previous studies (e.g., Kiser) have developed budget analyses to evaluate the costs
and benefits of cleaning wheat.  Our model differs in several respects.  The intensity of
cleaning operations  (i.e., quantity of grain cleaned and amount of dockage removed),
'Johnson  is Assistant Professor, Scherping is Research Assistant, and Wilson is
Professor in the Department of Agricultural  Economics, North Dakota State University,
Fargo.
2Mercier, et al. examine the implications of combining dockage with foreign material  in
the grading standards for wheat.  Recently, the Federal Grain Inspection  Service has
considered  introducing a separate grade limit for dockage.
3Scherping et al. provide a comprehensive  review of commercial  practices and costs of
cleaning in the spring wheat area.  Johnson  and Wilson examine the implications  of
dockage  for importers and U.S. export firms.  Wilson,  Scherping, Johnson and Cobia
provide an overview  of policy issues relating to dockage.2
which other studies have treated as exogenous,  is derived as part of the model solution.
Further, dockage levels  (and other quality attributes) are assumed to vary across bins,
and blending activities are allowed to substitute for cleaning.  These  features make the
model more realistic and improve the quality of simulations.
The report is organized as follows:  In the next section, the decision model is
formally described.  Data for the analysis are summarized in the third section.  The fourth
section presents results of sensitivity analyses along with simulations intended to
quantify the costs of cleaning under different assumptions.  The paper concludes with a
summary of our results.
II. Model Specifications
The decision model has much in common with a classic blending problem (see
Schruben  1968 and Ladd and Martin  1976 for examples  in grain).  An elevator has a
number of grain bins, each containing some quantity of wheat with specific quality
attributes.  Quantities and qualities vary across bins and are taken as given by the
decision maker.  Wheat can be sold directly from each bin or blended to meet a set of
contract  specifications  (e.g., protein, test weight, dockage, damage, or defects).  Different
prices apply to wheat that is sold separately and to wheat that is blended to satisfy
contract  specifications.  The objective is to maximize sales revenue net of various costs.
Introduction  of wheat cleaning adds complexity to the blending problem.  Unlike
other wheat quality attributes which can be altered only through blending activities, the
level of dockage in each bin can be controlled independently  through cleaning operations.
The elevator sells wheat on a dockage-deductible basis, that is, the sales price applies to
weight net of dockage.  Since freight charges are based on gross weight inclusive of
dockage, the elevator realizes savings on freight costs by cleaning before shipment.4  In
addition, material removed through cleaning operations  (screenings) can be sold as animal
feed.  The sum of freight savings and screening values less the cost of cleaning represents
an implicit "cleaning margin," which may be positive or negative.  Positive implicit
cleaning margins provide incentives to remove dockage  from wheat before shipment.
The elevator is assumed to have standard disk-cylinder cleaning equipment.  Costs
of operating this equipment depend  on the quantity cleaned  and on the intensity of
cleaning operations.  Cleaning to lower dockage  levels involves  a reduction of operating
efficiency,  i.e., longer running time for the machinery.  Cleaning operations also involve a
loss of salable wheat,  as shrunken  and broken kernels are removed along with dockage.
This "wheat loss" can represent a substantial part of cleaning costs, depending on the
level of shrunken and broken kernels in the grain being cleaned and the relative values  of
wheat and wheat screenings.5
4Note that freight costs are incurred by the country elevator rather than by the buyer.
That is standard practice  in the spring wheat region.
5As a component  of cleaning costs, wheat loss would be reflected  in the "implicit
cleaning margins" described above.3
The analysis proceeds from a number of simplifying assumptions.  Blending is
assumed to be costless.  The model takes no account of incentives to clean based  on
"improved storability" or limited storage capacity.  Inflows of grain to the elevator (and
decisions about cleaning prior to binning) are not incorporated in the model.  Rather, we
adopt the perspective of a merchandiser with known stocks, facing known prices.  Because
the model is static, it does not match the complexity of an actual merchandising
environment.  However, it does highlight the influence  of specific factors  (e.g., price
relationships, grain quality, and contract terms) on firm-level cleaning decisions.
The remainder of this section is somewhat technical.  Readers  who have no
interest in formal specifications can skip to the third section without much loss of
continuity.  The notation is identical to that of the computer program used in model
siniulations; variable indexes are enclosed in parentheses, rather than converted into
subscripts.  Copies of the program are available  from the authors upon request.
Ten storage bins are indexed by i (i  =  1,  2,...,  10), containing wheat with different
levels of the following attributes: dockage (DK), protein (PRO), test weight (TW),
shrunken and broken kernels  (SB), foreign material (FM), damage  (DAM), and defects
(DEF).  The elevator can satisfy two (or potentially more) sets of contract specifications
through blending; alternatively, the elevator can sell wheat directly from bins without
blending.  Formally,  let K represent a set of marketing choices:
k E K =  { NB, B1, B2 }
where NB indicates do not blend; B1 indicates blend number 1; and B2 indicates blend
number 2.  For later convenience, define  L as a subset of K, consisting of the two blends:
lEL={B1,B2}CK
Let J represent a set of (binary) cleaning choices:
jEJ={C, NC}
where  C indicates clean, and NC indicates  do not clean.
Let X(ij,k) denote the quantity (60-lb. bushels) from bin i devoted  to cleaning
alternative j and marketing alternative  k.  Thus, X(i,'C','NB') represents the quantity of
wheat from bin i that is cleaned but sold directly without blending; X(i,'NC','B') is the
quantity from bin i that is not cleaned,  but blended  and sold under the first set of contract
specifications.  All of the grain  is allocated (sold) under some combination of cleaning and
marketing alternatives:
CC X(i,j,k) s  QTY(i)  for all  i
j  k
where QTY(i)  is the total quantity of wheat  (bushels) available  in bin i.
Cleaning costs depend on the operating efficiency of the disk-cylinder equipment.
The rated capacity of this equipment,  denoted RCAP, represents maximum throughput4
(bushels per hour) under ideal conditions.  In practice, operating efficiency depends on the
intensity of cleaning operations,  i.e., the initial level of dockage and the level of dockage
after cleaning.  A linear relationship is specified:
PRC(i,k)  ao  + a  * DK(i) + a2  EDK(i,k)
where PRC(i,k) denotes proportion of rated capacity; DK(i)  is the initial level of dockage
(percentage) in bin i; and EDK(i,k) is the desired ending level of dockage after cleaning
operations.  Operating efficiency is inversely related to the ending level of dockage  (the
coefficient  a2  is negative).  An upper bound is also applied:
PRC(i,k)  1
so that actual throughput rates are not allowed to exceed rated capacity for the
equipment.
The initial dockage  DK(i) is given, but the decision maker chooses  EDK(i,k) for
each bin and marketing alternative.  For obvious reasons, the ending dockage level is
constrained  to be less than the beginning dockage  level:
EDK(i,k)  DK(i)
The time required to complete a cleaning operation,  MT(i,k) depends on the
quantity of wheat cleaned,  the cleaner capacity, and operating efficiency:
MT(i, k)  =  X(iC'k)
[  RCAP  PRC(i,k)]
An hourly cost CPH is imputed to cleaning operations.  This represents the sum of
variable costs (labor, electricity,  replacement parts) for the disk-cylinder equipment.
Additional handling costs  (such as elevation costs) may be associated with cleaning
operations.  Let HC denote this extra handling cost, expressed in dollars  per bushel.
Cleaning costs are given by:
CC(i,k)  =  CPH - MT(i,k)  +  HC * X(iC',Ck)
TCC =  U  CC(i,k)
i  k
where CC(i,k) denotes the cost of cleaning grain from a particular bin and for a particular
marketing alternative and TCC denotes the total cost of cleaning.
In addition to the costs of operating the equipment, the model allows  for a loss of
salable wheat.  This wheat loss consists of shrunken and broken kernels that are removed
along with dockage  during cleaning operations.  Specifically,  removal of shrunken and
broken kernels  is assumed to be proportional to removal  of dockage:
ESB(i,k)  = SB(i)  [  [EDK(i,k)/DK(i)]5
where ESB(i,k) denotes ending shrunken and broken percentage after cleaning operations
and SB(i) denotes the initial percentage before cleaning.  Screenings are given by:
S(ik)  =  DK(i)  - EDK(i,k)  + SB(i)  - ESB(i,k)  .X(i,'C',k)
100
TS  =  S (i,k)"  60
I  k  2000
where S(i,k) represents screenings  (60 pounds) from a particular cleaning operation and
TS represents  total screenings  (tons).  The ratio 60/2000  is used to convert units of
measurement.  Screenings are sold at a price PS.  The value of wheat loss depends on the
quantity of shrunken and broken kernels removed and on the value of screenings relative
to wheat.
To facilitate  other model specifications, several quantities are defined.  Let Y(ij,k)
denote bushels after (optional) cleaning operations:
=  X(i,'C'/,k)  - S(i,k)
Y(i,j(k)  =k[  X(i, 1 NC', k)
if  wheat is  cleaned
otherwise
These quantities represent gross bushels  (inclusive of dockage) sold directly, or blended
under a set of contract specifications.  For the two blends, total gross bushels (TGW) are
given by:
for 1  = Bl,  B2 TGW(l)  Y(i
Bushels net of dockage, denoted  N(ij,k), are defined  as follows:
I
Y(iC',k)  . [ 100  - EDK(i,tk)  0
Y(iNCk)  .[  00  100-J
Y(i  'NC', k)  * 1 0 0 -D K(i) [ -- 0 -
if  wheat is  cleaned
otherwise
Total net bushels (TNW) for the two blends are given by:
for  1  =  Bl,  B2
Let M(ij,k) denote bushels net of dockage and shrunken and broken kernels:
N(i,'C',k)  [ 100  ESB(i  k)]  if  wheat is  cleaned
[  1 00  o
M(i ,j,k)  =  1 N(i'NC'k) . o -SB(l  otherwise
100
N(i,j,k)  =
TNW  (1)  IV  (i  0,  r  16
For the two blends, the associated  totals are defined:
TMW(l)  =  M(i,j,l)  for 1  = Bl,  B2
ij
These quantities are used in specification of constraints--particularly  those identified with
contract limits for foreign material and damage.
Opportunities  for blending are limited by the quantity and quality of wheat  in
different bins and by contract specifications.  For each of the two blends, contract limits
are specified  for protein, test weight, dockage, shrunken and broken kernels, foreign
material, damage, and total defects.  These have the following form (for 1 = B1, B2):
Protein  (1)
=  N  [(iN  1)]  PRO(i)  2  constant
Test weight (1)
- [N(i j,1)] *TW(i)  constant jITNW"( 1)
Dockage (1)
=  Y  (i,  'C',1)'  EDK (i,)1)  + Y(i,'NC', 1)  DK (i)  constant
1  TGW(l)
Shrunken and Broken (1)
=  [N(i,'C'1)  * ESB(i,1)  + N(i,'NCi',)  ' SB(i)]  cnstant TNW(1)  J
Foreign Material  (1)
=  . i  T  , 1)  FM(i)  :  constant
Damage  (1)
S~  M(i, j,1)  DAM(i)  . constant
-
Total Defects  (l)
= Foreign  Ma terial  (1)  + Damage (l)
+ Shrunken and Broken (1)  <  constant
Definitions of these factors are consistent with Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS)
testing procedures.  The percentage of shrunken and broken kernels  is based on a
dockage-free  sample, while foreign material and damage are calculated  after removal of7
dockage and shrunken  and broken kernels.  Minimum contract limits apply to protein and
test weight.  Maximum limits apply to dockage, shrunken and broken kernels, damage
and defects.
Let T denote the freight cost ($ per bushel) of the elevator for all wheat sales.
This is applied to the gross weight of shipments, inclusive of dockage.  Total
transportation costs are given by:
TRAN=  T  [  Y(iij,'INBI)  +  TGW(1)]
Let P(i) denote the price at which the elevator can sell wheat (on a dockage-
deductible basis) directly from bin i, and let PC(1) denote the price associated with blend
contract 1. The objective function can now be specified.  The elevator seeks to maximize
its revenue from wheat sales and sales of screenings,  net of cleaning and transportation
costs:
Net Revenue  =  jjP(i)'  N(i,j,'NB')  +  CPC(1)  TNW(1)
ij  1
+  PS  TS  - TCC  - TRAN
Maximization  of the objective function is subject to the constraints--including identities,
and constraints concerning resource availability or contract limits--that are outlined
above.
Because of various  nonlinear constraints, the "feasible region" for the maximization
problem is not convex.  This means that, contrary to standard LP models, there is no
mathematical  assurance that a "local" optimum is simultaneously "global."  One way to
deal with this difficulty is to solve the model with different sets of initial values for
selected variables.  If the nonlinear solver generates  the same solution irrespective  of the
chosen initial values, there is reason to believe that a global solution has, in fact, been
identified.  (See Brooke, et al. p. 157).  We have adopted this approach in developing and
checking the model.  Based on some experimentation,  we have confidence in the quality of
results when the initial values for selected variables, i.e., ED(i,k) and X(ij,k), are not at
their upper or lower bounds.
III. Data for Model  Simulations
The model is intended  to represent  a typical country elevator in North Dakota.
Cleaning technology and costs were derived  from an elevator survey and engineering cost
study (Scherping et al).  Other features  of the model are based on regional crop-quality
data, average price relationships, and discussions with industry representatives.
Factors  affecting cleaning and blending decisions are highly variable.  Since prices
and quality attributes of wheat available  for blending vary over time, framing a "typical"
cleaning/blending problem is inherently difficult.  Our approach is to perform simulations
with two different sets of parameters, corresponding to two different crop years.  The two8
years, 1987 and  1990, provide  an interesting contrast.  Average dockage levels were high
in 1987,  and the value of screenings  was low, whereas the opposite was true in 1990.
Simulation results for 1987 and  1990 illustrate the sensitivity of model results to these
key parameters.
Grain quality data were taken  from results of an annual wheat quality survey in
which the NDSU Department of Cereal Science and Food technology tests wheat samples
from throughout the Hard Red Spring (HRS) growing region.6  Each sample is evaluated
in terms of protein, dockage, and grade factors.  Collectively, the samples  describe a
distribution of HRS quality attributes for a particular crop year.
We assign quality attributes to bins of our hypothetical  elevator as follows:
Individual samples from the regional survey are interpreted as truckloads of grain
received.  Truckloads are allocated to ten bins, depending on the level of protein and
dockage.  The bins are "filled" according to a scheme that-is consistent with observed
practices of country elevators, as shown  in Table  1.
Table  1:
Assumed  Binning Decisions
Dockage
Protein  DK s 1.0  DK > 1.0
PRO  < 13  BIN  1  BIN 2
13  < PRO s 14  BIN  3  BIN 4
14 < PRO  < 15  BIN  5  BIN  6
15 < PRO s  16  BIN  7  BIN 8
PRO  > 16  BIN  9  BIN  10
Thus, truckloads  with protein and dockage within specified ranges are pooled
together.  Within each pool (i.e., each bin), averages are computed for all quality
attributes. 7  The resulting matrix of attributes, displayed in Tables 2 and 3, provides the
basis for our blending problem.
In addition  to quality attributes, Tables  2 and 3 list quantities and prices for each
bin.  The quantities reflect observed  distributions  (i.e., proportion of grain allocated to
"Survey results are summarized in Shelton et al. and D'Appolonia et al.  Raw sample
data were furnished by the Department of Cereal Science and Food  Technology; these
were used to develop a representative distribution of wheat quality attributes for our
hypothetical  elevator.
7This mimics the "blending" of incoming grain through binning decisions.  However,









































































































Quality Attributes and Other Bin Parameters, 1990
BIN1  BIN2  BIN3  BIN4  BIN5  BIN6  BIN7  BIN8  BIN9  BIN10
PRO  12.44  12.48  13.44  13.51  14.42  14.44  15.40  15.28  16.54  16.95
DK  0.36  1.65  0.36  2.08  0.38  1.93  0.37  2.09  0.52  1.61
TW  61.67  59.70  61.23  58.76  61.17  58.66  60.79  58.86  59.12  57.74
SB  1.00  1.30  1.02  1.41  0.89  1.50  1.10  1.42  1.41  1.54
FM  0.02  0.09  0.04  0.07  0.03  0.11  0.03  0.17  0.05  0.04
DAM  0.12  1.41  0.30  1.52  0.23  1.14  0.25  0.69  0.09  0.15
DEF  1.14  2.81  1.36  3.00  1.16  2.75  1.39  2.30  1.56  1.73
QTY  9  5  20  9  18  12  11  7  5  4
PRICE  2.77  2.754  2.82w  2.80  3.02  3.00  3.28  3.24;  3.32N  3.31%
CD
I I I I a
BIN1
I
BIN2 BIN3 BIN5 BIN6 BIN9 BIN1010
individual bins) for individual crop years.  Quantities are in thousand bushels; for
simplicity, they are normalized to sum to 100 thousand.  Prices ($/bu) are based on actual
market quotations and include applicable  premiums for protein and test weight.8  These
are the prices that would apply to wheat sold directly from individual bins; consequently,
they also represent  (gross) opportunity costs for bushels that are blended under terms of a
given contract.  Price spreads between high and low protein wheat were substantially
larger in 1987 than in  1990.
The cleaning cost specification  has two principal  components: the efficiency of the
disk-cylinder equipment and the cost per hour of operation.  A leading manufacturer
provided the following estimates of throughput rates for different levels of beginning and
ending dockage:
Table  4:
Operating Efficiency  of Disk-Cylinder  Cleaner







Beginning  Dockage  (DK)
5%  3%  1%
.6  .8
.5  .7  1.0
.4  .6  .8
.3  .5  .6
Regressing proportion of rated capacity on beginning and ending dockage,
following equation (t-statistics in parentheses):
PRC  = .7449  - .1019 DK  +  .3882 EDK
(21.03)  (11.54)  (8.88)
we obtained the
Adj. R2 =  .95
These relationships are shown graphically  in Figure  1.  Because ending dockage  is
constrained  to be no greater than beginning dockage,  the triangular section at the lower
left of Figure 1 has no practical interpretation.
'Based  on Minneapolis spot prices, with relevant premiums  and discounts,  as quoted
in The Forum (September 17,  1987,  and September 14,  1990).11
Figure 1:






Operating costs are estimated at $5.05 per hour.9  This includes costs of
electricity, labor, and replacement parts for the disk-cylinder  cleaner.  It does not include
depreciation or opportunity costs of capital.  Extra handling costs  (HC) are assumed  to be
zero.10  Figure 2 displays operating costs on a per-bushel basis.  Per-bushel costs depend
on operating efficiency and, hence, on beginning and ending dockage levels.
For base-case  simulations, the value of screenings  is $10 per ton in  1987 and  $30
per ton in  1990, average North Dakota values in those years.  The cost of freight in the
base case is $.85  per bushel.  This is a weighted average of freight costs from North
Dakota to principal markets.
IV. Simulation Results
Results  of several simulations are reported in this section.  First, the model  is
solved with different values of two key parameters--the  value of screenings  and the cost of
transportation--to  illustrate the sensitivity of model solutions.  Second, simulations are
performed  to evaluate the "minimum discounts" necessary to induce cleaning, given a set
of contract specifications.  Third, we examine the impact of including dockage as a grade-
determining factor.
Sensitivity Analysis
The "supply function" for screenings provides one way to illustrate the economics  of
cleaning.  As stated earlier, incentives  to clean are directly influenced by the value of
screenings and by the cost of transportation.  However, the supply of screenings  may shift
from year to year, depending on overall  levels of dockage in wheat  received by the
elevator and other parameters.
Figures 3 and 4 show the elevator's supply of screenings  for two years, using crop
quality data from  1987 and  1990.  The figures are based on sets of simulations in which
the value of screenings and the cost of transportation were varied parametrically.  For
simplicity, other parameters  were adjusted  to remove any influence  of contract limits on
cleaning.  Quantities (tons of screenings) are measured  along the vertical axis in each
figure.
The price of screenings  (Figure 3) shows a pronounced  impact on supply for both
years.  For screenings  prices below $15  to $20 per ton, the implicit margin is apparently
negative:  cleaning does not occur and no screenings are produced.  Larger volumes  of
screenings are associated with each price in  1987, due to higher average dockage  levels.
9See Scherping et al. for details.  The disk-cylinder equipment corresponds  to "Cleaner
B" in that report.
'0If handling costs were introduced, smaller volumes of grain would be cleaned.  The
impact would be lessened by changes in the intensity of cleaning (higher proportion of
dockage removed).14
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Figure 4:
Supply of Screenings as Function of Cost of Transportation
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Market and quality conditions of 1990 are such that a higher price for screenings  is
necessary to induce cleaning.  That can be attributed to lower beginning dockage levels"
and higher levels of shrunken and broken kernels (which affect wheat loss).
Transportation costs also affect the supply of screenings  (Figure 4).  Higher costs
induce more cleaning (and therefore screenings) because of greater implied savings on
freight.  Paradoxically,  the impact is more pronounced under conditions of 1990,  when
dockage levels  were low.  The price of screenings was also higher that year--$30 per ton,
versus  $10 per ton in  1987.  Given the low screening values of 1987, transportation costs
of $.90 per bushel (higher than assumed in the base case) would be necessary to induce
cleaning at our hypothetical  elevator.  This highlights the combined importance  of two
factors--transportation  costs and the value of screenings--for  the profitability of cleaning.
Figures 5 and 6 show an alternative view of these results.  In each figure, the
proportion of bushels cleaned, rather than supply of screenings,  is measured along the
vertical axis.  Under base-case  assumptions, the elevator cleans about a third of all
bushels in  1990 (with screenings  valued at $30 per ton).  No cleaning occurs under base-
case assumptions  for 1987 (with screenings valued at $10 per ton), despite higher average
levels of dockage.
Commercial Discounts
Another factor that can influence cleaning (and will likely be of increasing
importance in the future) is specification of premiums or discounts.  Premiums  for cleaner
wheat, or discounts for lots with dockage exceeding a particular level, though not
pervasive in current trading practices, can induce more cleaning.  For example, a buyer
may specify, along with other contract terms, that a price discount applies if dockage
exceeds  some level.  In fact, merchants  have periodically used this strategy to procure
HRS  from country grain elevators.
Under these circumstances,  the seller must analyze whether it is more profitable to
accept the discount and avoid cleaning costs or to avoid the discount by cleaning to satisfy
the contract limit.  The answer depends on the magnitude of the discount, the maximum
dockage limit, levels of dockage in the elevator's bins, and possibilities for blending.
Simulations  were performed to provide insight into the effects of discounts.  The
goal was to determine, for a given set of contract terms, the "minimum discount"
necessary to induce cleaning.  To that end, a set of contract terms was specified (Table 5)
with a price sufficiently high to attract a large share of the elevators grain.12  For
experimental  purposes,  various maximum dockage limits were specified.
"With  lower beginning dockage  levels, a larger volume of grain  is cleaned in order to
generate a given quantity of screenings.
12Although the model offers  two blend  contracts, only one was necessary for these
simulations; the price for the second blend was lowered  sufficiently to force it out of the
solution.19
Table 5:
Assumed  Contract Terms for Evaluation of Discounts
Minimum  Protein:  14 percent
Minimum  Test Weight:  59 pounds
Maximum  Dockage:  *
Maximum  Damage:  1 percent
Maximum  Defects:  3 percent
Contract Price
1987:  $3.50 / bushel
1990:  $3.10 / bushel
* Varied between  0.2 and  1.0 percent.
Calculating a "minimum discount" proceeds  in two steps.  First, the model is solved
with a maximum contract limit for dockage.  This yields a profit level for the elevator.
Second, the dockage limit is relaxed,13 and the contract price is lowered  (by quarter-cent
increments) until the same profit  level is attained.  The difference between the original
price and the lower price (with relaxed  dockage limit) is interpreted as the discount
necessary to induce cleaning.  If the discount were any smaller, the elevator would
maximize profits by not satisfying the contract  limit and absorbing the discount.
This procedure was followed  for a range of contract  limits under both sets of wheat
quality conditions  (i.e.,  1987 and  1990).  Results are shown in Figure  7.  For both years,
an inverse relationship  is  evident: the lower the dockage limit, the greater the discount
necessary to induce cleaning.  Discounts  are larger under quality conditions  of 1987, due
to higher average levels  of dockage and low screening values.  Under  1990 quality
conditions, discounts  are required only to induce cleaning below 0.4 percent dockage.
Some cleaning was profitable  under base-case  assumptions for  1990, even in the absence
of discounts.
A "market solution" to the problem of excess dockage in U.S. exports would involve
transmitting price discounts from  foreign buyers to export firms and ultimately country
elevators,  in much the same way that premiums and discounts for other quality attributes
(e.g., protein) are conveyed  within the grain marketing system.  The elevator model
adopts a supply-side perspective,  focusing on the firm's optimal response  to price
incentives.  However, the demand for quality attributes also determines the value of
quality attributes, as indicated  in a companion study (Johnson and Wilson).
'SIn  particular, the limit was inflated to 5 percent--higher than the dockage level  in
any of the elevator's bins.20
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Change in Grade Standards
It has been proposed that dockage be incorporated  in the official grade standards
for wheat.14  In particular, a maximum limit of 0.5 percent dockage would be specified
for grades  #1-3,  and a maximum limit of 2.5 percent dockage would be specified for grades
#4-5.  Limits for other grade factors would remain unchanged  under this proposal.
Proponents argue that, since foreign buyers typically specify grade #2 or better, the effect
would be to lower average levels  of dockage in U.S. wheat exports, thereby improving
competitiveness.
The aggregate  impacts of such a change (i.e., in terms of U.S. export revenue) are
difficult to foresee.  There is no assurance that foreign buyers would continue to specify
the same U.S. grades after a change  in standards.  In fact, individual buyers--for whom
dockage  is not an important quality factor--might choose to specify lower grades than
previously to take advantage  of price differentials.  This would lead to a reduction  in
other grade factors.
The elevator model can be used to demonstrate how a change in grade standards
could affect a merchandising firm.  For this purpose, simulations were conducted  in which
grain sales were confined to two possible blends 5 --the first identified with grade #3
contract limits and the second with grade #4 contract  limits.  This highlights the
significance of the breakpoint in proposed grade limits for dockage (i.e., between grades #3
and 4).
Grade limits are reproduced  in Table  6.  Some grade factors (e.g., contrasting
classes) are omitted from the analysis.  Based on our assumptions about grain quality
(Tables 2 and 3), all of the elevator's wheat  would meet or surpass the current grade #3
limits  (before inclusion of dockage).
Table 6:
Wheat Grade  Limits
U.S  No.  3  U.S.  No. 4
Minimum  Test Weight  (Ibs.)  55.0  53.0
Maximum  Damage  (%)  7.0  10.0
Maximum  FM  (%)  2.0  3.0
Maximum  SB  (%)  8.0  12.0
Maximum  Defects  (%)  8.0  10.0
Maximum  Dockage  (%)  0.5*  2.5*
* Under  proposed grade standards.
14Personal communication with FGIS.
"Rather  than formally restricting quantities, prices  for the two blends  were set
sufficiently high to attract all grain from the elevator's  bins.22
Our purpose is to estimate the cost to the elevator of including dockage as an
additional grade factor, assuming that the elevator blends  (and cleans) simply to meet
grade limits. 6  Accordingly,  simulations  were conducted both with and without the
indicated  dockage limits.  With grade 3 selling at a premium relative  to grade 4, the
elevator would sell all wheat  (in either crop year) as grade 3 or better under current grade
standards.  With the introduction of grade limits for dockage, the elevator is induced to
"upgrade" some of its wheat through cleaning--provided  that a higher price for grade 3
more than offsets cleaning costs.
Price relationships are a crucial aspect of this problem.  For illustrative purposes,
simulations  were conducted with different assumptions  about the price difference between
grades  3 and 4.17  Results are displayed  in Table 7.
Table 7:
Impact of Including Dockage  as Grade  Factor Limit
Current  Proposed
Price  Difference  Grade Standards  Grade Standards
Grade  3  % sold as  % sold  as
- Grade 4  % cleaned  grade 3  % cleaned  grade 3
or better  or better
-1987  Crop Quality--
2 cents  0  100  38  81
4 cents  0  100  52  100
-1990  Crop  Quality--
2 cents  28  100  28  100
4 cents  28  100  28  100
"In  practice, it is uncommon  for country shippers to blend to meet grade limits.  More
common is blending to meet limits for individual  factors, which may not necessarily
correspond with grade limits.  Although the premise of these simulations is unrealistic,
there are few alternatives  for estimating the impact of a change  in standards.
"It  is not standard  for commercial traders to quote prices for grades  3 and 4; rather,
traders typically quote a price for grade 1, with discounts for individual  factors.  The
difference in price between  grades can thus depend  on which factors deviate  from grade
limits.  Discounts vary according to the factor and over time.  (Scherping and Wilson).23
The proposed change  in grade standards would affect the extent of cleaning activity
in  1987.  Under existing grade standards and base-case  assumptions, the elevator had no
incentive  to clean in that year.  Introducing a dockage limit induces  cleaning.  Under new
grade standards, the extent of cleaning in 1987 depends on the size of the price premium
for grade 3: a larger premium  induces more cleaning.
In contrast, the change in grade standards does not affect cleaning in 1990.  Under
base-case assumptions, the elevator had other incentives  to undertake cleaning activities
in that year and could satisfy the new grade standard for dockage without additional
expense.
Thus the proposed change in standards would have a significant  impact only in
1987.  Additional costs of 0.7 cents per bushel (averaged over all bushels sold) would be
incurred  in  1987 so that all wheat could meet or exceed  the grade 3 limits.  These are net
costs, taking into account the value of wheat loss due to cleaning, returns from sale of
screenings, and transportation  savings.s 1  Assuming no change in sale prices, the net
costs of satisfying new grade limits would be reflected in compressed margins or (more
likely) passed along to producers as lower elevator bid prices.
In principle, the net impact of a change in standards  would depend on what
happens to price relationships, including market discounts  for dockage and other grade
factors.  Although prices could be altered by a change in standards, these effects are
difficult to predict.
V. Summary and Implications
Dockage in wheat is a non-grade-determining  factor in the U.S. marketing system.
In individual transactions, dockage  is a contract term that is subject to negotiation
between buyers and sellers.  Other countries  include the equivalent of dockage as a grade-
determining factor with stringent  limits.  The configuration  of grade limits (in conjunction
with inter-grade  price differentials) determines  the incentives  to clean in these countries.
Similar proposals have been made in the United States.  Specifically, the 1990 Farm Bill
enables the Federal Grain Inspection Service (FGIS) to establish or amend  grade
standards  with a view to match levels  of "cleanliness" offered by competing countries.
This paper develops a mathematical  programming model to analyze cleaning
decisions at country elevators.  The analysis incorporates  a detailed model of cleaning
costs and places cleaning activities within the broader framework of a blending and
merchandising problem.  By incorporating alternatives to cleaning, i.e., blending from
different bins and shipping wheat without cleaning, the model provides a more realistic
basis for assessing the impact of selected variables and for evaluating how alternative
regulations would affect the economics of cleaning.
'8As noted previously, the model takes  no account of investment costs, which are fixed
from the point of view of a firm with cleaning equipment already in place.  For elevators
without such equipment, the prospective  costs of a change in grade standards would be
substantially higher.24
Model parameters  were chosen to represent a typical country elevator in North
Dakota.  Simulations were performed  for two crop years,  1987 and  1990, to demonstrate
the sensitivity of cleaning decisions to factors that vary through time.  Of particular
importance are the level and distribution of dockage and other quality characteristics  in
the crop, and the value of screenings.  The year 1987 was characterized by a crop with
greater dockage and lower screening values than was  1990.
The value of screenings  and the price of transportation have an important
influence  on incentives to clean, and thus on the proportion  of wheat that is cleaned
before shipment.  For each of our representative years, screening values greater than $20
to $25 per ton induced cleaning.  Savings on transportation costs provide an additional
incentive, particularly when high freight costs are combined with high screening values.
Under our base-case assumptions  for 1987, cleaning was profitable  only for longer hauls,
i.e., with freight costs in excess of $0.90 per bushel.  In 1990,  freight costs of
approximately $.50  per bushel were sufficient to induce cleaning.
The level of discount (premium) necessary to induce additional cleaning before
shipment was shown to vary from year to year.  Under our assumptions  for  1987, a
minimum discount of 1/2  cent per bushel was necessary to induce cleaning down to
0.5 percent dockage.  No such discounts were necessary in  1990 because of other
incentives  favorable to cleaning.
Cleaning wheat is a routine part of elevator operations  in some parts of the United
States, particularly in the spring wheat growing regions.  Cleaning is purely a commercial
decision at present, not affected by non-market regulations.  Margins  associated with
cleaning reflect the cumulative impact of a number of variables, including the amount of
inbound dockage, the value of screenings,  and transportation  costs.  In addition, cleaning
decisions may be influenced by contract terms such as premiums for cleaner wheat or
discounts for lots with dockage exceeding a particular level.  Though not pervasive in
current trading practices, discounts for excess dockage can induce cleaning to satisfy the
demands of individual buyers.
The effectiveness  of using grade factor limits to induce cleaning would depend  on
numerous variables, as demonstrated  in this paper.  An important limitation is that,
without equal factor limits being applied to all grades, elevators could choose to ship at
grades with larger allowable  limits for dockage.25
REFERENCES
Brooke, A.,  D. Kendrick, and A. Meerhaus.  1988. GAMS:  A User's Guide.  San Francisco:
Scientific  Press.
D'Appolonia,  B., T. Olson, G. Matthiensen,  R. Nelson, and D. Puhr.  1990.  "The Quality of
the Regional (Montana, North and  South Dakota, Minnesota)  1990 Hard Red
Spring Wheat (DNS) Crop."  Department of Cereal  Science and Food Technology,
North Dakota State University, Fargo.
Johnson, D., and W. Wilson.  February 1992.  "Measuring the Impact of Dockage on
Foreign Demand for U.S. Wheat."  Agricultural  Economics  Report No. 284,
Department of Agricultural  Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo.
Kiser, H. "Cleaning Wheat at a Country Elevator -- A Case Study."  December  1984.
Kansas Wheat Commission and Kansas Agricultural Experiment  Station,
Manhattan.
Ladd, G., and M. Martin.  "Prices and Demands for Input Characteristics."  American
Journal  of Agricultural  Economics 58(1976):21-33.
Mercier, S., M. Leath, C.E. Young, and W. Lin.  March  1989.  "Economic Implications  of
Combining Dockage and Foreign Material  in the Grading Standards for Wheat."
Report Submitted to the Federal Grain Inspection Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
Scherping, D., D. Cobia, D. Johnson, and W. Wilson.  February 1992.  "Wheat Cleaning
Costs and Grain Merchandising."  Agricultural Economics  Report  No. 282,
Department  of Agricultural  Economics, North Dakota State University, Fargo.
Scherping, D., and W. Wilson.  September 1991.  "Pricing and Marketing Practices  for
North Dakota Durum and HRS Wheat,  1990 Crop Year."  Department of
Agricultural Economics,  North Dakota State University, Fargo.
Schruben, L.  "Systems Approach to Marketing Efficiency Research."  American Journal  of
Agricultural  Economics 50(1968):  1453-1471.
Shelton,  D., B. D'Appolonia, T. Olson, G. Matthiensen,  R. Nelson,  and D. Puhr.  1987.
"The Quality of the Regional  (Montana, North and South Dakota, Minnesota)  1987
Hard Red Spring Wheat (DNS) Crop."  Department of Cereal  Science and Food
Technology, North Dakota State University, Fargo.
U.S.  Congress, Office of Technology Assessment.  February  1989.  Grain Quality in
International  Trade:  A Comparison of Major U.S. Competitors. F-402. Washington,
D.C.
Wilson, W., D. Scherping, D. Johnson, and D. Cobia.  "Impacts of Alternative Policies
Regulating Dockage." Department of Agricultural  Economics,  North Dakota State
University, Fargo. (Forthcoming.)